The role of stochastic models in geophysics is discussed from both an historical and a philosophical point of view. Specific models for earth quake sequences are analysed in the light of these general considerations, and some related developments in this general area are reviewed.
Introduction
Although my title refers specifically to earthquake sequences, I would like to use this topic to illustrate some aspects of a more general theme, the roleof stochastic models in a science such as geophysics.
One reason for pursuing such generalities, even at a Conference where I know the main interest will be on new discoveries and techniques, is a concern that the role of stochastic models is not well understood, and that this feature itself may be a brake on progress in this area. I refer in my abstract to the almost paradoxical situation that, whereas most geophysical data presents an extremely random appearance, there can be few sciences other than geophysics where mathematical models remain so firmly deterministic in character. I think it is important to ask how far this is due to the nature of the subject matter, and how far to matters of style and tradition. And to resolve this question one needs to have some idea of what stochastic models are for, in general terms, and when they are likely to be useful.
Another reason for my choice is that, in my own work also, I have felt a desire to examine more critically the role of stochastic models and the general principles underlying their development and use. Ten years ago, when I first became involved with problems of statistical seismology, I was prepared to take on any geophysicist who dared to suggest that statistical ideas were less than central to the development of geophysical theory. Now I am more cautious. Although the last few years have shown a continuing increase in the application of statistical techniques in geophysics, as well as a sprinkling of papers on stochastic models, there has been no really definitive progress in this field; no outstanding instances where one can feel that the understanding of geophysical phenomena has been substantially advanced by the application of stochastic ideas; no convincing resolutions to long standing problems. Again one would like to know more about the reasons for this situation; is it expecting too much to look for advances of this kind, or are there particular reasons why stochastic models are hard to develop in geophysics ?
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I am under few illusions as to my ability to provide final answers to these questions, which indeed raise deep philosophical and scientific issues. But I shall try to illuminate some aspects of them, while at the same time providing something of a critical review of the current situation in regard to stochastic models for earthquake sequences.
Early history and tradition
Let me start by referring briefly to the early history of statistical ideas and their contacts with geophysics. Perhaps the first figure one should mention in this respect is Galileo, who not only commented on the problem of combining observations, pointing out the desirability of choosing a value that would minimize the discrepancies, but also contributed one of the earliest correct assessments of the odds in a simple dice game. Huyghens, too, made a notable contribution to the early development of probability theory, and it is to him that the notion of mathematical expectation, critical to the scientist's even more than to the mathematician's treatment of probability, is due. But the figure to whom I would most like to draw your attention is Sir Edmond Halley, that notable representative of the generation which, as Bullard has said (l), at once discovered the content and invented the technique of modern science. It is not for me to write of Halley's work as a geophysicist; it has been well celebrated by Bullard and others. His contribution to statistics consists of a brief but influential paper on mortality tables and their uses in actuarial calculations (2). It was the first paper to draw up a table properly based on reliable data, and the first to lay down a proper procedure for making use of such a table to calculate the value of annuities.
De Moivre, writing about 1730, by which time several rival tables had appeared, suggests that Halley's table be retained, ' as no bad standard for mankind in general, until such time as a better Police, in this and other nations, shall furnish us the proper data for correcting it, and for expressing the decrements of life more accurately and in larger numbers ' (3). It was a further century before the Census programme foreshadowed here was in operation, and during the whole of this time Halley's table was extensively used as a basis for actuarial computations. The qualities which gave his paper its enduring character were, I have little doubt, the same as those which appeared also in his geophysical papers: a painstaking checking of all available information; the exercise of imagination and good judgement in the interpretation of numerical data; its presentation in a clear and easily utilized form. Little matter that Halley had no access to formal statistical tests or theorems; it is qualities such as those listed above, as much as any technical knowledge, which to the present day form the hallmark of good statistical work. Halley was the first (but certainly not the last, for we have some outstanding representatives in our own time, Sir Harold Jeffreys among them) to demonstrate the eminent compatibility of good statistics and good geophysics.
The next landmark I wish to note is the independent discovery, by the famous German mathematician Gauss and the less well-known American scientist Adrian, of the fundamental role of the normal distribution in the theory of errors. The normal distribution itself had figured in earlier works by de Moivre and Laplace, but it was Gauss, in particular, who developed its intimate connections with the method of least squares and the theory of linear models. Both writers were impelled by the practical requirements of astronomy and geodesy, which surely may be considered geophysics' scientific aunts, if not her sisters.
It is just at this point however, at the very apogee of the classical theory of errors, that one can discern the beginnings of a break between the later developments of probability and statistics and the practice in the physical sciences. For the very success of the classical theory of errors led to its subsequent entrenchment, in somewhat ossified form, in the subjects it served best. More than this, the normal distribution came to assume an unduly prominent role throughout the physical sciences. Not only was it found in the most diverse fields of application, but it lent itself to dramatic derivations from simple first principles-surely a feature calculated to endear it to the theoretical physicists and applied mathematicians. No doubt it was this situation which led to the famous remark (attributed by CramCr (4) to Lippman) that ' Everyone believes in the law of errors, the experimenters because they believe it is a mathematical theorem, the mathematicians because they believe it is an experimental fact '. Even when Rutherford first described his observations on a-particles, the results were received with scepticism because they followed the Poisson rather than the normal distribution. Now, I am not going so far as to suggest that such attitudes are widespread in geophysics today; indeed there is abundant evidence to the contrary. But in so far as geophysics, particularly in the undergraduate courses, leans heavily on the techniques of 19th century applied mathematics, there is a danger that it will look towards statistics with the eyes of a 19th century applied mathematician, and see it mainly concerned with the normal distribution and the theory of errors. The danger is greater just because modern statistics developed in a totally different scientific environment. Its pioneers, figures such as Frances Galton and Karl Pearson, had wideranging interests, but above all they were concerned with the applications to genetics, evolution, population theory. Later, with the work of ' Student ' and Fisher, the emphasis shifted to the agricultural sciences. A considerable and regrettable schism developed between the statisticians and the applied mathematicians. It is a moot point, for example, how far Fisher, in his early development of regression and analysis of variance techniques, was aware of the overlap with Gauss' earlier work on linear models. Conversely, it was only with great difficulty, and extremely recently, that statistics was able to win itself a position of respectability in such a bastion of the British applied mathematics tradition as the University of Cambridge. The situation was not improved by the fact that probability theory, which maintained its position on the Continent as an important branch of pure mathematics, was also under-represented on the British scene, probably because of the British antipathy to formal mathematical analysis, the branch of pure mathematics with which probability theory has its closest links. Thus, until the last decade at least, it has not been possible to point to a British school of probability theory which could compare with, say, the French or Russian schools in this field. From both sides, therefore, from both pure and applied mathematics, there have been barriers to the infiltration of statistical and probabilistic ideas into geophysics.
At the present time, I think the greatest single factor which continues to hinder this development is the difficulty of inserting an adequate treatment of statistics within the very full programme of a geophysics student. He already has to cover substantial amounts of material from classical applied mathematics, physics and geology. To load onto his shoulders yet a fourth specialization, in probability and statistics, would surely crush the spirit of the staunchest geophysics enthusiast.
The net effect of these factors, at least within our own institution in Wellington, is that very little statistical theory, let alone more recent developments such as the theory of stochastic processes, finds any place in the geophysics programme. In fact it is commonly only in their 4th or 5th years that geophysics students first come into contact with statistical reality, usually in the form of the results of some practical project or their MSc thesis. Then their fate is suddenly made manifest to them; they need statistics to analyse their data. Somehow, by hook, crook, or cookery book, they acquire a smattering of statistical jargon sufficient to appease the sadistic examiner with an eye for the missing confidence interval or misunderstood significance level. Small wonder if they thereafter view statisticians with reserve, as at best the curators of an elaborate maze through which they were compelled to wander, and at worst the cause of their downfall.
It would take me outside the scope of my talk to suggest remedies to this situation, but if in fact it exists outside our own institution, I think it is a problem worthy of serious attention. Otherwise I fear it must remain as difficult for a classically trained geophysicist to embrace probabilistic notions as it is for me to embrace such essential ingredients of classical geophysics as the propagation of waves in an elastic medium, and if this is the case it is hard to visualize much progress in statistical geophysics emanating from either source.
On the nature of stochastic models
Before we look at any particular model in detail, I would like to make a few general remarks on the nature of stochastic models, not with the intention of entering deeply into the philosophy of the subject, but in the hope of giving direction to the subsequent discussion of particular cases.
The case for including statistical considerations in the formulation of physical laws has been expressed with characteristic forthrightness by Sir Harold Jeffreys, in the introduction to his well-known book on probability theory (5). Discussing the traditional, deterministic laws he writes ' It is not true that the observed results agree exactly with the laws actually used. The most that the laws do is to predict a variation that accounts for the greater part of the observed variation; it never accounts for the whole. The balance is called ' error ', and usually quickly forgotten or altogether disregarded in physical theories . . . '. However, ' The outstanding variation, for practical purposes, is as essential a part of the law as the predicted variation, and a valid statement of the law must express it '. In its ultimate form, as he goes on to point out, this point of view is embodied in the Heisenberg uncertainty principle; but he regards it as inescapable for all scientific work.
It is not my intention to proceed, as Jeffreys does, to develop from this starting point a system of inductive inference in which probabilities appear as measures of confidence in certain statements given certain evidence. My concern is rather with the following question. If we regard physical laws, or at a humbler level mathematical models, as a collection of primary statements, the logical consequences of which are then explored deductively using the familiar methods of mathematical analysis, and if we accept a need to include in the model some statements which will lead to conclusions about the residual variability, then what form should these statements have ? How, in other words, should the probabilistic element be injected into the mathematical model?
It is important to emphasize that probabilistic elements cannot arise of themselves in the course of a deductive argument. There is no escape therefore: if we want to obtain statements about the residual variability at the end of our chain of reasoning, some statements about variability must be included at the beginning. The simplest way of handling this situation is that associated with the classical theory of errors: the underlying physical processes are supposed deterministic in character, and the only uncertainty, or scatter, is due to errors of observation. In this formulation the probabilistic aspect is entirely decoupled from the physical aspect. It figures only as a nuisance element, devoid of intrinsic scientific interest (save perhaps to philosophers and statisticians), but requiring attention in order to make statements of precision and for certain technical and engineering purposes.
This seems to me a dangerous attitude to adopt in geophysics, for it is a gross oversimplification, a travesty of the real situation, to suppose that the scatter in geophysical data arises only because of observational error. However obvious this may seem, it is not hard to find examples where this attitude has shaped the form of scientific hypotheses or procedures, sometimes with quite misleading results. One example of this is the treatment of ' Bith's law ' in the seismological literature. I have writken about tKk elsewbexe (a), but hope you will beaT wifn me if I a 1 1 it again to illustrate this point.
The object of discussion is the magnitude difference between the main shock and the largest aftershock in an aftershock sequence. If we denote these magnitudes by M,, MI respectively, and the difference between them by D, the law, which is attested by numerous examples, asserts that
irrespective of the value of M , or the size of the sequence which follows. Adumbrations of this theme in the recent literature allow for variation of the difference with depth, and perhaps with other factors also. Some scatter in the value of D is observed, but it is assumed that for geophysical purposes, i.e. for discussions of models in which the difference might play some physical role, it is adequately represented by its estimated mean value 1 .2.
What is ignored here is the fact that earthquake magnitudes are themselves quantities which vary considerably from case to case, in a manner which can hardly be attributed to observational error, but which is adequately summarized by the Gutenberg-Richter relation bring the latter information to bear, the crudest and simplest assumption that could be made, would be that the magnitudes in an earthquake sequence formed a random sample independently selected from a distribution having the exponential form (*). M , would then correspond to the largest value in the sample, and M1 to the second largest value. Now it so happens that there is a rather striking theorem concerning the difference between the largest and second largest values in a random sample from an exponential distribution: this theorem asserts that the difference has a distribution which is independent of the size of the sample or of the value M , , and is in fact the same exponential distribution followed by the individual sample values. The theorem is a consequence of the ' lack of memory ' property of the exponential distribution, as summarized in the conditional probability statement
and is discussed in (for example) Chapter 1 of Feller (7). Such a result might seem better suited to repudiate the random sample model than to support it, since an exponential distribution has little in common with the sharply-peaked distribution about 1 .2 that the observational evidence seems to imply. Nevertheless the independence of the distribution of the size of the sample is suggestive, and perhaps warrants a closer examination of the apparent discrepancy. Unfortunately I have never seen a set of data which would allow an adequate discussion of BBth's law from a statistical point of view. The nearest approximation I know of is still Utsu's table of Japanese aftershock sequences (S), from which the smoothed histogram in Fig. 1 
the final ratio expressing the correction factor that needs to be applied to the unconditional distribution to obtain the form estimated by Utsu's data. On the simplest further assumption that M , also has an exponential distribution, we find
The conditional distribution (which is not given in (6) though it is readily deduced from the other results therein) is therefore constant in the range 0 < D < 2, then drops exponentially towards zero. The fit with Utsu's data is now more convincing, and suggests that for Japanese earthquakes at least, such evidence as there is in favour of BBth's law is adequately explained by the simple assumption that the aftershock magnitudes form a random sample from the usual magnitude distribution. This does not prove, of course, that the same explanation is tenable in respect of other data, but it does put the onus on the proponents of the law to show that it cannot be explained away in this fashion. I gave this example in some detail because I think it is of interest in its own right as a stochastic model, and because it illustrates the possible dangers of assuming too readily that every measurable quantity can be expressed in terms of a mean obtained from deterministic considerations, and a scatter due to observational factors and other irrelevant features.
We are left with the problem of trying to decide what sort of probability statements are most appropriate for inclusion as initial statements in the specification of a stochastic model. In the preceding example the assumptions were that the sample elements were chosen independently according to the same distribution. This is an appealing initial assumption because of its simplicity. But what exactly is it that constitutes simplicity in a probability statement? A useful guide to the answer of this question is provided by the notion of entropy. If we think of this loosely, as meaning uncertainty, it is very reasonable to suggest that our initial assumptions should isolate the features concerning which our uncertainty is greatest. There is then some real motive for the deductive exercise involved in exploring the properties of the model, for it shows how the uncertainties can be reduced or modified by the interaction with the structural elements of the model.
In a quantitative respect also, the concept of maximum entropy can be extremely useful, as Jaynes and his followers have been pointing out for some years (9). Thus, most of the familiar distributions can be characterized by a property of maximum entropy, calculated according to the simple rules Cp, logp, for a discrete distribution and Sf(.) Iogf(x) dx for an absolutely continuous distribution. A well-known example from statistical mechanics is the normal distribution for molecular velocities, which has maximum entropy when the variance (determined macroscopically from the total kinetic energy) is fixed. The exponential distribution has maximum entropy for a continuous distribution on [0, 03) with fixed mean; the uniform distribution has maximum entropy for a continuous distribution on a prescribed finite interval; the power law distribution (Prob ( X > x) = x-") has maximum entropy for a distribution on [l, 03) with fixed logarithmic moment J log x f (x) dx. A multivariate distribution with prescribed marginal distributions has maximum entropy when the components are independent (whence the binomial distribution has maximum entropy when the number N and probability p of success in a sequence of trials is prescribed). Among stochastic point processes, the Poisson process generates entropy at a maximum rate for a given mean rate of occurrence. These simple rules provide a useful guide in many common situations, and we shall see examples of their application in the next section.
To conclude this section I would like to comment briefly on the view that probabilistic methods are not relevant to geophysics because geophysical processes are essentially deterministic in character. In principle, I do not see any significant reason for treating geophysical processes as exceptional in this regard, and would abide by the sentiments I attributed to Sir Harold Jeffreys at the beginning of this section. In practice, the decision to utilize a stochastic model in preference to a deterministic one is basically a question of the usefulness of the model for the purposes at hand. The French writer MathCron, in an interesting review of the role of stochastic models in geology (lo), suggests that they are likely to play a useful scientijic role when a change of scale is in play; that is, when the randomness is associated with structural elements on a microscopic scale, while the features of interest figure on a macroscopic scale and are the result of mass interactions of the microscopic elements. Certainly the large numbers, whether of individual objects or replications in time, are needed to provide a situation where probabilities can be usefully introduced; they have little to add to the ' one-shot ' situation, unless that ' one-shot ' can itself be represented as the mass interaction of causes on a still smaller scale. Finally, one may suggest that it is through the engineering and economic applications of geophysics, where decisions in the face of uncertainty cannot be avoided, that probabilistic methods are likely to have their greatest impact.
Aftershock sequences
The problem of finding stochastic models for aftershock sequences remains, to me, the most interesting aspect of statistical seismology. Some of the earliest results of statistical seismology relate to this field-for example Omori's law that the frequency of occurrence of aftershocks delays hyperbolically, the Gutenberg-Richter law concerning the exponential form of the magnitude distribution, as well as more recent results such as Bgth's law discussed in the preceding section and Lomnitz's discovery of the stability of the magnitude distribution along the length of the sequence. (It is worth pointing out in passing that on this last point some recent studies by Gibovicz (11) do show up minor variations in the b-values, but they are of a small scale (10-20 per cent) and not systematic in character, so it is perhaps fair to suggest that they do not affect the general picture that to first order the value of b remains constant; he attributes the changes observed to changes in the stress situation following certain critical events such as major aftershocks.)
By and large, these results remain without a very convincing physical explanation. Many suggestions have been put forward, but mostly of a tentative, qualitative, or partial kind. The nearest approach to a convincing synthesis, in my opinion, is the discussion in Cinna Lomnitz's recent book (12). This treatment contains a number of novel ideas, and is particularly valuable in that he brings together a wide range of both physical and statistical considerations to support his arguments. Nevertheless I do not find the discussion completely satisfying either from a logical or a physical point of view, and I am sure that much remains to be said on this subject.
My purpose in this section is twofold: partly didactic, to illustrate some ideas from the preceding section; and partly critical, to review some of the various models that have been put forward.
I think the first statistical model for aftershocks is due to Jeffreys (13), who suggested that the time sequence of aftershocks could be treated as a non-stationary Poisson process. The agreement here is very good, and the model would also be satisfactory, from the entropy point of view, if it was reasonable to suppose that the average rate function was determined on basic physical grounds, and the only randomness left related to the precise times at which the aftershocks occurred. The model implies the absence of any detailed interaction between the times of the shocks and the physical process governing the form of the decay law, but leaves us still looking for an explanation of the decay law itself. I know of only one attempt to provide such an explanation, due to Lomnitz (14), who suggests that there are thermodynamic grounds for expecting a hyperbolic decay in any process representing a return to equilibrium of some physical system. I am not competent to judge the validity of his reasoning, but in any case would prefer to see a supplementary argument, couched in more immediate physical terms, that would convince a seismologist (or a statistician for that matter) not certain of the relevance of general thermodynamical reasoning.
An attempt to provide a more explanatory model was made by Aki in his review paper on statistical seismology (15). Aki suggested that the intervals between successive shocks should increase on the average by a constant proportion at each step, a feature which is easily shown to lead to the hyperbolic law for the average rate. To incorporate the randomness, he supposed that the successive intervals followed independent exponential distributions with mean values z, = Cp" (p > 1). Again this is the natural assumption from the entropy point of view if it can be supposed that the dependence on n is known a priori on physical grounds. However, the direct dependence on the ordinal number seems to me no more plausible than the dependence on the time in the previous model, and it leaves us still seeking an explanation for the specific form of 2,. Again the model does not explain Omori's law, but throws it back onto another and physically no more obvious law.
Yet a third model is put forward in Lomnitz's book, in which the hyperbolic form is derived as a mixture of exponentials with varying parameters: m (1+t/c)-' = /f(cx)e-"'dr 0 if the density functionf(cx) is itself of exponential form:f(a) = ce-"'. Once again we have not so much explained Omori's law, as thrown it back to a prior result which still requires explanation, and in this case seems to me less physically obvious than the original proposition itself.
None of these models makes any attempt to incorporate magnitudes into the results, perhaps because of an implicit assumption that the frequencies and magnitudes are independent aspects of the process and therefore require separate, individual, explanations. In 1966 I put forward (16) an extension of Aki's model which sought to exploit the idea that each aftershock, on the average, released a certain fixed proportion of the residual strain energy, the waiting time to the next shock also depending in a simple way (a positive power) on the strain energy. Combining both features we see that as in Aki's model the time intervals increase by constant multiples, so that the hyperbolic law is again recovered. However, the form of the frequency magnitude law to which this reasoning leads is quite inconsistent with the observed data. For the energies released in successive aftershocks will also decrease in constant multiples, which means the magnitudes (a decibel scale for energies) will be uniformly spaced; these features match neither the magnitude stability property nor the GutenbergRichter law.
The model is, however, of additional interest because a variant has recently been proposed by Knopoff et al. (17) for a steady-state situation where the energy loss due to aftershocks is balanced by an immigration of energy at constant rate from external tectonic sources. To explain the differences between the models, it is necessary to describe them in slightly greater detail. Both are Markovian, with the state variabIe representing the residual energy in the system; the Markovian property means that the system is governed by the current value of the state variable, and retains no memory of its earlier history. The probabilistic structure is then specified by two functions, a rate function A(E), the reciprocal of which represents the mean waiting time between shocks if the system is constrained to remain in the energy state E . and a jump density t ( x I E ) giving the probability density for the new position x given that the system is in state E when the jump occurs. Both models assume that t ( x I E ) = E -' , corresponding to a uniform (maximum entropy) distribution over the remaining energy range (0, E). They differ in that I used a form I ( E ) = kE" (cx > 0) on grounds of general plausibility and tractability, whereas Knopoff worked back from the known form of the frequency-magnitude law to obtain an inverse power law I ( E ) = kE-'. Thus in Knopoff's version we have to assume that the higher the energy state, the longer the waiting time. Such an assumption would lead to the rather paradoxical conclusion that in a closed system (no energy influx) the rate increased at the same time as the magnitudes of the shocks decreased. Knopoff avoids this difficulty by relating the aftershocks to the beginning of the charging cycle following a large shock in the system with energy input. However, we would then expect an increase in magnitudes with decreasing frequency.
It is my opinion that neither of these models is satisfactory, and that the conclusion we should draw is that in the real system the energy state does not critically affect the form of the magnitude distribution. This is also the content of Lomnitz's magnitude stability relation, which implies the approximate independence of the magnitude distribution from the factors governing the frequency of aftershocks. We are left with the problem of explaining the Gutenberg-Richter relation as a statistical law in isolation. The extraordinary ubiquity of this law-it is found in more or less the same form over a colossal energy range, from major tectonic earthquakes on the one extreme, through microseisms and seismoacoustical phenomena, down to microscopic cracking in Laboratory samples on the other-suggests that it may have a rather general geometrical basis. In terms of energies the GutenbergRichter relation takes the power law form Prob ( E > x) = x -~ which expresses a property of scale invariance: the proportion of those shocks with energies greater than x which have energies between x, 2x, is the same as the proportion of those shocks with energies greater than 2x which have energies between 2x, 4x, etc. The coefficient j3 should be interpreted in terms of the proportionate increase in energy required to produce a halving (say) of the frequency. Many geometric patterns can be drawn which have this property of scale invariance, among them certain types of dendritic patterns; this suggests the possibility that the law might be associated with the distribution of fault lengths, where the lengths are determined by the structure of the material (location of inhomogeneities or zones of weakness) rather than the stresses to which the material is subjected. Since there are grounds for supposing the energy radiated in an earthquake to be proportional to the area of the fault, it may be worthwhile examining in detail some possible models for crack lengths.
A very crude model for crack lengths might be some kind of branching process. If the crack spreads from layer to layer of a lattice, for example, each new layer would correspond to a new generation, and the total length of the crack to the number of generations before extinction. Now it is a well-known theorem (see Harris (18) that in near-critical conditions, (which are presumably the relevant ones since if the situation was subscritical the crack would not spread, and if it was supercritical it would have already occurred) the asymptotic behaviour of the time to extinction is of the form Prob (length > n) x Kn-l.
This would lead to a relation of the right form for the energies if it was reasonable to suppose (energy) K where the index 312 corresponds to the value b = 1 in the standard form of the Gutenberg-Richter law. Further information might best be determined by Monte Carlo determinations of a slightly more realistic model which took in to account the dependence between offspring of the same generation (the same lattice point cannot be counted as a member of more than one family.) If these dependency considerations were important, a type of percolation process (19) might be a more realistic model than a branching process, but the intractability of such processes makes one doubt the possibility of obtaining corresponding asymptotic results analytically.
Further topics
topics.
In this final section I shall refer briefly to developments in a few selected further This topic has been an important point of contact between the statisticians and the seismologists over the last few years, partly at least because it provides an application of an area within probability theory, point processes, which has itself been undergoing a very rapid development, as the two International Conferences on Point Processes (New York, 1971 (20) and Kuelingsborn 1974 (21) bear ample witness. There is, however, a danger in such a situation, that the models will be chosen as much with a view to illustrating new techniques as because of their real seismological interest. Since there is now a large array of models to choose from, and since most can be fitted to a reasonable degree of approximation by a suitable choice of parameters, the seismologist may be justified in feeling some degree of bewilderment. This difficulty was previsaged by Matheron (22), and I agree with his conclusion that the way out of it is for the mathematicians to fall back on the scientists for guidance in developing what he calls ' genetic ' models: based, that is, on the scientists' insight into the physical processes involved.
Another difficulty is the more familiar one that the great majority of results refer to simple time series, with only a few scattered results for multiple time series or time series incorporating an ancillary variable such as energy or location. Nevertheless, there have been some important attempts to grapple with the more difficult problems of multiple series, see for example D. R. Brillinger's recent paper on earthquakes and the Chandler wobble (23), and the papers by Lewis and Rice later in this session.
In the meantime I would like to mention just three models. The Neyman-Scott model used in our original analysis of New Zealand data (24) still seems to me as good a choice as any for a I-dimensional analysis. The modelling of clusters by a time dependent Poisson process affords a good approximation, and the only mathematical difficulty arises from the attempt to incorporate a power law form for the decay function. Hawkes & Adamopoulos (25) get over this difficulty by fitting instead a mixture of two exponentials, one for the short term clustering and the other for the longer term. The resulting model is more tractable analytically and seems to provide quite a reasonable approximation.
Another very interesting model (the ' self-exciting process ') has been developed by Hawkes (26) and applied to earthquake series by Hawkes & Adamopoulos (25) and Rice (27). The process is also described by Lomnitz (11) under the picturesque title of the ' Klondyke model '. It is characterized by the fact that the conditional rate at any time t is a linear combination of influence function deriving from past earthquakes
where Et denotes the past history of the process up to time t, the {ti} are the times of past earthquakes, and g is a non-negative decay function satisfying T g ( t ) d t < 1.
0
Despite this model's intuitive appeal, it is only moderately successful in fitting the earthquake data (see the above references). I think there may be two reasons for this. In view of the discussion in the preceding section, I am sceptical of any model that incorporates some kind of state variable that determines the rate of occurrence; moreover the physical nature of the dependence function g( . ) is not clear. Secondly, it has recently been shown by Hawkes & Oakes (28) that this model can in fact be interpreted as a process in which cluster centres occur as a Poisson process, the individual clusters having the form of a segment of a birth-and-death process. This means that the clusters are rather drawn-out, and therefore would not be appropriate as a model for the intense clustering associated with shallow earthquakes(they might, however, fit rather well the sort of clustering that appears to occur with intermediate or deep earthquakes, but I do not know if this has been tried out in practice).
Finally, I would like to mention the model invented by Kagan (29) . This is a model incorporating energies, and Kagan's basic idea is to consider an immigration-death model, with the twist that the evolution takes place along the energy axis (in a negative direction) rather than along the time axis. He is then able to apply well-known results of Bartlett (30) on such processes to obtain the major observed features of earthquake catalogues, such as the Gutenberg-Richter frequency-magnitude law, the negative binomial (rather than the Poisson) distribution for the numbers of shocks in a time interval of fixed length, and the logarithm distribution for cluster sizes. I am still not exactly clear as to the physical content of ' branching along the energy axis ', but I am sure that a model which reproduces so many results from such economical assumptions is worthy of close study.
(b) Comparative studies
Comparative studies are one of the natural areas of application of statistical methods, as well as an area which holds promise of a useful contribution to seismology. There are, however, considerable practical and technical difficulties which lie in the way of an easy realization of this promise. The problem of securing homogeneous data is bad enough within any one particular region, but it is multiplied greatly when it comes to comparing data sets from networks in different countries, which make use of different equipment, interpret the readings with a different tradition, install the equipment for different purposes, and maintain it with different degrees of efficiency. Magnitudes present a particular problem for comparative regional studies. An indication of the magnitude is absolutely essential for comparative purposes, not only in its own right, but as the only presently available guide to comparisons of network efficiency and of the regions effectively covered by networks of differing efficiency. The fact that little of the data before the early 1960's carries magnitude indications renders most of that data useless for comparative statistical purposes. Even at the present time, data are reported using magnitude scales which not only differ numerically but are based on different physical quantities, so that they are by no means perfectly correlated, and require time-consuming and expert advice to make conversions which are at best unsatisfactory.
It is my personal feeling that this whole question might warrant further review by the International Organizations currently publishing earthquake data lists, with a view to providing an annotated digest in standard units that would form the basis of comparative statistical studies. Either this, or the organizations should be given additional support to enable them to undertake the statistical analyses themselves.
The other difficulty, of a more technical kind, is that of finding suitable parameters to characterize the earthquake regime in a given region. At the present time the only parameters which have been studied in any detail are the seismicities (mean rates of occurrence for earthquakes in a specified energy band) and the b-values (slopes in the Gutenberg-Richter law). It would be of interest also to have comparative information about the nature and extent of clustering. There have been some preliminary attempts to examine this aspect on a comparative basis, foi example by Shlien & Toksoz (31) and Hawkes & Adamopoulos (26). But these authors use different parameters, different models, different definitions of the regions and I find it impossible to relate the results one to the other. Again this points to the need for a convention in regard to the choice of a standard model, which need not be perfect, but can at least be the means of making objective comparisons. The Neyman-Scott model with mixed exponential decay function (cj. Hawkes & Adamopoulos (26) might be suitable for this purpose.
Even within the same general region local comparisons may be possible and may provide useful scientific information; one such example is a recent study of variations of b-value with depth in New Zealand data (Gilbert (32) ). Similar results have been obtained by Dr Gibovicz of the Seismological Observatory, who has also studied variations in b-values along aftershock sequences. In both cases there is claimed a meaningful relationship with stress variations in a dipping oceanic plate. But both investigations required the processing of thousands rather than hundreds of data points, and the variations in b-values were only picked up after a careful screening of the early data for inhomogeneities and changes in network sensitivities.
(c) Statistical methods for earthquake prediction
It is hard to envisage any practical scheme of earthquake prediction that does not include some elements of statistical decision making, and I am confident that this element will be inserted by the engineers even if it is overlooked by the geophysicists. Of course there is no question of statistical methods supplanting the exciting work on predictive variables currently in progress. It is a question rather of how to make use of the predictive information when it becomes available.
I have suggested elsewhere (33) that the problem is most constructively formulated in terms of calculating the earthquake risk, meaning by the latter term the probability of occurrence of a large damaging earthquake (defined according to some accepted but otherwise arbitrary criterion) over a stated time period such as a day or a week. At present, the statistical information based on past history, geological information, instrumental data, etc., is sufficient to give estimates of the daily risk which are no more than crude mean values, of the order, for a town such as Wellington, New Zealand, of or Earthquake prediction will start to become worthwhile when we have the ability to detect variations from these mean values to values of the order of or A knowledge that the risk had risen to this level would make it worthwhile to insist on extra safety precautions and the making ready of emergency plans. By the time it is possible to make valid statements that the daily risk has risen to a value as high as lo-', we will have already reached the stage when it is sensible to discuss plans for evacuating a part or the whole of a city's population.
The study of estimates of this kind would be a useful supplement to the study of early warning systems which might operate within a few minutes of the occurrence of a major earthquake.
The mathematical techniques which would be involved in such estimates of earthquake risk are essentially adaptations of regression methods. It is possible to develop a linear theory based on second-order properties (34) while in certain special cases more exact, non-linear methods are available (35) . Much detailed work on particular models still needs to be done, but I am more confident than I was at the time of my RSS paper (37) that the mathematical background is well enough understood to enable practical and effective methods of prediction to be developed when the basic geophysical information becomes available.
(d) The magnitude distribution: exponential or log normal?
Throughout the discussion I have tacitly assumed that the Gutenberg-Richter law is adequately represented by a striaght line on the log-frequency/magnitude plot. In practice, the line is almost invariably curved, steepening at high magnitudes and flattening off at low magnitudes. In many cases this effect is at least partly due to instrumental factors, but the accumulated evidence is now so great, and so consistent, that I do not feel it can be dismissed as due to instrumental effects alone. If the straight line is replaced by a parabola, the distribution which results is of lognormal type. This is a distribution which is also of widespread occurrence; it was shown by Kolmogorov (36) to be an appropriate distribution for grain size in rock crushing experiments, and it may be expected whenever the observed random variable is obtained by a sequence of proportionate reductions, say where the proportions pf are independently and randomly distributed. Lomnitz (13) has suggested that fault areas might be determined by a process of this kind, which would lead to a lognormal distribution for earthquake energies if the relation between energies and fault areas was taken into account.
While I accept the need for a more complex parametric form for graduating the data, and perhaps also for extrapolation, 1 have never been convinced by the arguments in favour of the lognormal distribution as a physical model for earthquake energies. Unlike the power law form, the lognormal commits one to a choice of scale, corresponding to the ordinate of the vertex of the parabola. This is difficult to reconcile with the fact that something like the Gutenberg-Richter law is found in widely different energy scales: surely at least one of these would correspond to the rising branch of the parabola, if in fact the parabolic form was correct? Similarly, one would expect to find a wider variation in b-values; with the lognormal form there would be no reason to expect them usually close to 1 if the lognormal form was correct. Finally, the analogy with rock crushing may be superficial; at least one would like to see a more explicit account of exactly how the proportionate reductions are obtained, in physical terms. Lomnitz cites also the analogy with stream lengths in a dendritic river pattern, but my impression is that the distribution of stream lengths shows a clear mode, unlike the distribution of earthquake energies; here again one would like to see a harder, more explicit argument before accepting the immediate force of the analogy.
Concluding remarks
My primary aim in this paper has been to make out a case for the view that there are important geophysical problems which are best discussed, perhaps can only be discussed, in terms of stochastic models. In seismology, these problems currently centre round the frequency-magnitude law and the mechanism of aftershocks. The problems are difficult, and the tentative steps which have so far been taken towards their solution reflect the difficulties of working with unfamiliar concepts in an alien tradition. Even more importantly, they show up the lack of real physical understanding of the processes involved. To some extent this is inevitably the case, for the area of usefulness of stochastic models lies at the boundaries of what is well understood or can be precisely measured; they are a means of extracting useful information from partial knowledge. As time passes, our knowledge may increase and these particular uncertainties may be resolved. But this does not mean that the need for stochastic models will be eliminated, only that their area of usefulness will be pushed back to a still more primitive level.
Let me say finally how much I have enjoyed the opportunity of trying to crystalhe some of the general sentiments that have been in my mind over a number of years, and how much, as an ' amateur ' geophysicist, I appreciate the privilege of being invited to join your discussions and present a paper here.
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